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Abstract
The rise of toxicity and hate speech on social media has become a cause for
concern due to their effects on politics and the growth of extremist inter-
net communities. The tools currently used to identify and eliminate harmful
content have received widespread criticism from both the public and the aca-
demic community for their inaccuracies and biases. In our research, we set
out to audit the performance of Perspective API, a toxicity detector created
by research teams at Google and Jigsaw, on the language of users across a
variety of demographic categories. We draw from Crenshaw’s framework of
intersectionality to discuss the unique harms that result from existing at the
intersections of marginalization and examine existing computational models
of disparate impact and proxy discrimination. In addition, we conduct A/B
testing on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a popular crowd-sourcing platform for
data annotation within research communities, to identify and discuss biases
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The Information Age has generated unprecedented levels of human innovation
and discovery, but it has also led to the rise of a startling variety of digi-
tal injustices. Some of them are simply new forms of long-existing human
inequities, like algorithms that claim to identify the best candidates for uni-
versity admissions or a particular job listing [25]. The vast majority, however,
are distinct phenomena that require particular approaches and state-of-the-
art solutions. After all, flawed technologies are harmful not simply because
they magnify existing human biases, but because they do so in ways that are
extremely difficult - if not impossible - for humans to predict and regulate.
People have motives and intents, but ultimately, computational systems are
merely the unbiased vehicle of a biased world.
1.1 Related Work
One well-known case study is the polarizing example of COMPAS, a recidi-
vism prediction instrument (RPI) used in courts around the United States to
determine the length of sentence for convicted criminals. A widely popular-
ized investigation conducted by a team at ProPublica [1] concluded that the
instrument, which predicts a person’s likelihood of offending again using demo-
graphic information, disproportionately predicting higher rates of re-offending
for Black defendants. Specifically, the authors found that a nonrecidivating
black defendant is nearly twice as likely to be assessed as high risk as a white
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defendant and similarly, a recidivating black defendant is nearly half as likely
to be assessed as low risk as a white defendant. In technical terms, their find-
ings indicated that the COMPAS instrument violated the fairness criterion of
error rate balance. Specifically, COMPAS generates significantly higher false
positive rates (FPR), the improper indication of a condition, and lower false
negative rates (FNR), the improper indication of a lack of presence, for black
defendants than for white defendants.
The investigation faced much criticism from the Northpointe corporation
and within the academic community, primarily for the criteria the researchers
had used to determine fairness. In its statement, Northpoint [24] argues that
the fairness of the COMPAS instrument had been incorrectly evaluated and
should have instead been validated by predictive parity, a fairness criterion
that COMPAS does satisfy. Flores et al. [15] argues for yet another metric of
calibration, which COMPAS also satisfies.
The issue is that there is an incredibly large number of computational
definitions for fairness, the vast majority of them mutually exclusive [8]. In this
case, predictive parity is incompatible with error rate balance when prevalence
differs across groups. The COMPAS RPI is approximately well calibrated
and satisfies predictive parity, provided that the high-risk cutoff sH is 4 or
greater. The instrument fails on both false positive and false negative error
rate balance across the range of high-risk cutoffs, however. The error rate
imbalance of COMPAS is not just a logical outcome of its current design; it
cannot be mitigated while in its present context.
When the recidivism prevalence — or the base rate P (Y = 1 | R = r) —
is different for each group, any instrument that satisfies predictive parity at a
given threshold sH will have unequal false positive or false negative error rates
at that same threshold. Given a particular choice of sH , we can describe an
instrument’s performance in terms of a confusion matrix, as shown in Table
1.1.
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Low risk High risk
Y = 0 TN FP
Y = 1 FN TP
Table 1.1: T/F denote true/false and N/P denote negative/positive. For in-
stance, FP is the number of false positives: individuals who are classified as
high risk but who do not reoffend.
The fairness metrics described in the previous section impose constraints
on the values in this table. Another constraint is imposed by the recidivism
prevalence within groups. Chouldechova shows that the prevalence (p), PPV,
and false positive and negative error rates (FPR, FNR) are related through
this equation:
FPR = (1 − FNR) p
1 − p
× 1 − PPV
PPV
.
From this expression, we see that an instrument can satisfy predictive
parity, but if the prevalence differs between groups, the instrument cannot
achieve equal FPRs and FNRs across those groups. As the recidivism rate
among black defendants in the data is 51%, compared with 39% for white
defendants, we know some level of imbalance in the error rates must exist in
order for the instrument to achieve predictive parity. As not all of the fairness
criteria can be satisfied at the same time, it becomes all the more important to
understand the individual consequences of failing to satisfy particular criteria.
Broad incompatibility in the literature
The case of the COMPAS RPI is a microcosm of the broader debate occuring
in the field of algorithmic fairness. A growing body of work seeks to compre-
hensively evaluate the performance of different formal definitions of fairness
and similar measures.
Friedler et al. [17] identify the axiomatic differences at the heart of the
debate and develop a mathematical theory of fairness driven by transforma-
tions between different categories of space. The work highlights more spaces
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implicitly involved in the decision-making process than typically specified, and
it argues that much of the confusion and disagreement within the literature
occurs when scholars conflate them. To create a framework with which to
study fairness criteria, they reinterpret notions of fairness, structural bias,
and non-discrimination as quantifying the way that spaces are transformed to
each other. Finally, they show that the majority of methods which propose to
address algorithmic fairness hinge on implicit assumptions about the nature
of these spaces and how they interact with each other.
A more recent paper [18] argues that although different algorithms tend to
prefer specific formulations of fairness preservations, many of these measures
strongly correlate with one another. Particularly, they find that fairness-
preserving algorithms are sensitive to fluctuations in dataset composition,
which suggests that fairness interventions may be less adaptable than hoped.
In response, the paper presents a test-bed for determining which algorithm has
the best performance under a fairness or accuracy measure, as well as what
types of algorithmic interventions tend to be the most effective in the long
run.
Hutchinson et al. [21] explore 50 years of research centred on machine learn-
ing fairness to determine historical lessons and areas of potential further work.
The paper goes even further than similar work by calling for more actionable
work on the causes of unfairness as opposed to directionless conjecture on the
nature of fairness. They also emphasize the clear articulation of assumptions
and choices through incorporating quantitative factors for the balance between
fairness goals and other considerations, such as a value or ethics system.
In the absence of concrete right and wrong, it appears that the only way
forward is to determine and choose the best approach for the particular cir-
cumstance. That is, one must consider and address the costs and gains of the
choices made in the design of the underlying system when using, scaling, or
drawing conclusions. In the fight against disparate impact, it does not matter
that an algorithm can behave perfectly as much that an algorithm can behave
clearly, able to explain why a particular approach was determined to be the
most fitting for the situation.
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1.2 Hate Speech and Toxicity Detection
These questions of intent and impact are especially important in the field of
hate speech and toxicity detection, which existed only until recently as an
afterthought for moderators of digital communities who felt a need to limit
profanity and obscenity in their corner of the Internet. With allegations of
election interference and the rapid growth of dangerous extremist groups in
Internet communities, however, industry and academia have begun to take a
much harder look at how toxic language and otherwise harmful content can be
detected and eliminated in large swathes. Research has revealed that tradi-
tional toxicity detectors, which check new content against existing databases
of profane or harmful text, ignore nuances of context and produced biased
results [27].
The issue is that a majority of terms associated with hate speech are iden-
tifiers for marginalized identities or words that have since been reclaimed, such
as ”queer” [33]. When algorithms remove content that contains these words,
they disproportionately remove content by and about members of those same
communities, who use the terminology to self-identify or share their personal
experiences. One such incident was the subject of a 2019 lawsuit against
YouTube for restricting all LGBT+ content to mature audiences [3]. Similar
complaints have been levied against Facebook, where users have been given
suspensions and had their posts removed for discussing discrimination that
they have faced, even resulting in the deletion of entire communities [20]. Tox-
icity detectors also run into general obstacles of natural language processing
tools, such as human biases within word embedding [4] and imperfect training
data that do not paint an accurate picture of the world. For example, research
has shown that tweets in African-American English are twice as likely to be
labeled as offensive than others by models trained on popular hate speech
data sets, which perpetuates African-American stereotypes about aggression
and vulgarity and excludes voices of a marginalized community from research
[27].
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1.3 Perspective API
One notable toxicity detection tool is the Perspective API, a free tool devel-
oped by Jigsaw and Google’s Counter Abuse Technology team in a collabo-
rative research project. Its primary and oldest offering is a machine learning
model trained on hundreds of thousands of pieces of human-annotated text
[10] to predict the perceived harm of a comment on its readers. At its con-
ception, Perspective operated very similarly to other toxicity detection tools,
”[providing] a score from zero to 100 on how similar the new comments are
to the ones identified as toxic.” Currently, they offer a variety of additional
tools ranging from real-time feedback for commenters to grouping comments
by topics for readers [26]. While Perspective only offers production models
for ’Toxicity’ and ’Severe Toxicity’ at the moment, experimental models like
’Flirtation’ and ’Identity Attacks’ are tentatively available and suggest that
future versions may contend with problems of sexual assault and hate speech -
high-profile issues not only for their specificity but for their strong precedence
in the legal field.
Since its debut in February of 2017, Perspective API has been adopted
by news media worldwide like The New York Times [31] and Spain’s El Pais
[14]. It has received its share of criticism as well, with users pointing out
that shorter text inputs were more likely to be rated as toxic by the model
and identified a worrying correlation between identity words of marginalized
communities and higher scores, regardless of the actual position and content
of the message[19].
Some patterns can be seen easily in Table 1.2, particularly the increase of
toxicity with additional identity words. Other relationships between text and
toxicity scores are more complicated. Note that ”I am a woman” receives twice
the toxicity score of ”I am a man,” but ”I am a gay woman” is only 9 points
higher than ”I am a gay man.” There is no linear relationship between the
identity words and their toxicity scores, or even how toxicity score increases as
different identity words are included. It is interesting to note, however, that
the inclusion of racial identifiers is more potent than those describing sexual
identities (”I am a gay woman” with a toxicity score of 0.66 versus ”I am a
white woman” at 0.77 and ”I am a black woman” at 0.85), even in comparison
to a word that has historically been used as a slur (”I am a dyke,” which -
interestingly enough - is lower than all of the aforementioned with a toxicity
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score of 0.60.)
Critics pointed out that if and when similar tools are used broadly, entire
populations can be silenced and censored, gone without a trace to anyone on
the outside. Some warned that these alarming results could be only the peak of
the iceberg, suggesting that that even more harm were being caused by black-
box automated comment-policing systems already at work in the innards of
Facebook and Twitter [19].
Text Input Toxicity Score
I am a man 0.20
I am a woman 0.42
I am a lesbian 0.51
I am a gay man 0.57
I am a dyke 0.60
I am a white man 0.66
I am a gay woman 0.66
I am a white woman 0.77
I am a gay white woman 0.78
I am a black man 0.80
I am a gay white woman 0.80
I am a gay black man 0.82
I am a black woman 0.85
I am a gay black woman 0.87
Table 1.2: Toxicity scores calculated by Perspective API, August 2017 [19]
Three years later, the Perspective API has undoubtedly improved in leaps
and bounds in response to the critical response it garnered. Much of the
code for the tool is now entirely open-source, with many of the experiments,
research data, and models associated with Perspective made publicly available.
The Jigsaw team even offers a practicum in debugging issues of fairness and
bias within their models, which walks users through a real case of pinpointing
and eliminating disparate impact within toxicity detection. The false-positive
problem for comments containing identity terms is explained as a consequence
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of the training data - the majority of comments containing identity terms
for race, religion, and gender were labeled toxic, but while these labels were
mostly correct in context, the skew nonetheless taught the model a correlation
between presence of these identity terms and toxicity. The main issue was not
human biases in the training set, rather that the data did not contain sufficient
examples of nontoxic identity comments for the model to learn that the terms
themselves were neutral and that the context in which they were used was
what mattered. According to the practicum, the Jigsaw team balanced the
data and eliminated bias in the algorithm by the simple but insightful act of
up-weighting negative subgroup examples.
When we queried the current API model, however, we found results that
bore great similarity to those in Table 1.2. Some improvements were clear,
particularly for the specific examples above, but the API continued to produce
a series of false positives and false negatives for common use cases. These
results can be found in Table 4.2 and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4,
which is dedicated to our audit of Perspective API.
The implications of these results were concerning. If a research project that
prioritizes transparency and fairness can perform so poorly against the human
biases deeply ingrained within language, how fares any of the many toxicity
detection systems being used by the world’s most popular forms of social me-
dia? Moreover, these gains in accuracy are complicated by the aforementioned
non-linear increases in toxicity with identifier words, which suggests that de-
creases in toxicity may follow a similarly non-linear path. When 40 percent
of bias is eliminated for a particular group, then, it becomes important to un-
derstand which 40 percent. Not everyone in a marginalized group experience
marginalization equally, and eliminating a particular amount of harm may
mean significant improvements for an individual and anything from no effect
at all to the exact opposite for another.
This study investigates disparate impact and bias in the context of toxicity
detection under the theoretical framework of intersectionality. We first out-
line our investigation into modeling webs of relations between discriminatory
proxies by generating synthetic data with Bayesian networks. Additionally,
we will describe our process of validating our experiment design through A/B
testing trials conducted on Mechanical Turk. We then discuss our audit of
Perspective API, for which we observed its performance on tweets made by
users from a variety of demographic categories. Finally, we explore the sig-
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nificance of our results and describe next steps in the project. Our research
seeks not to offer concrete computational definitions or a single correct form of
classification. Ultimately, we conduct this study to question long-held assump-
tions surrounding bias and harm (and the elimination thereof) that exist not






Countless papers and workshops within the computer science field discuss the
gender [6] and racial [13] biases within algorithmic systems and software design,
the majority of which tackle the two separately. Very little research has been
conducted on the overlaps, however, including disparate impact that does not
lie within these often arbitrary boundaries.
The framework of intersectionality, as coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw [11],
arose from critical race theory and describes the ways in which individuals who
exist at the intersection of multiple marginalized identities experience unique
harm. For example, a black woman will not only experience the prejudices
directed at women and at black people, but the harm that emerges particularly
from being a black woman. We believe that the framework of intersectionality
must be leveraged to design algorithmic systems that are truly just, which is
different from simply achieving an arbitrary level of fairness or eliminating a
certain amount of bias. Though the framework of intersectionality emerged
from and is used largely outside of computer science, we ground our research
in it to emphasize the importance of basing algorithmic and experiment design
choices not just in theory, but theory that originates from seemingly unrelated
fields of study.
Binaries and data are the foundations of computer science, however. Given
the fundamental limitations of computational research, it is no surprise that
researchers have struggled to model, let alone solve the complex and unpre-
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dictable issues of society. Below, we detail unique concerns that originate from
this crucial mismatch of tools and problems.
2.1 Proxy Discrimination
Though many modern algorithms treat race, gender, and class as protected
classes or eliminate them from the training sets entirely, disparate impact
emerges nonetheless. Thus is the problem of proxy discrimination, in which
data-driven systems inherit biases from subtle correlations within the data
between the protected attribute and seemingly innocuous features. In other




Figure 2.1: Redlining modeled by proxy discrimination
A simple example of proxy discrimination can be seen in Figure 2.1. An
algorithm may disregard race and class data of an individual but include infor-
mation on their zip-code. Zip-codes, however, correlate so strongly with both
race and class that bias against zip-codes causes the same disparate impact
as bias against people based on their race or class. In other words, zip-codes
have become a discriminatory proxy for race and class.
Despite being similar to the real world phenomenon of redlining, in which
companies systematically refuse services to certain zip-codes with majority
black populations [9], proxy discrimination causes additional harm as a result
of its unpredictability and ambiguity in the face of legislation [34]. Technical
and legal researchers alike have argued that removing obvious biases within
data sets can in fact exacerbate discrimination by creating new types of biases
that are much more difficult to detect [2]. While zip-codes are clearly related to
race and class, for example, machines can find something entirely unexpected
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(like amount of carrots consumed per year) that nonetheless correlates with a
protected class to make biased decisions. Historically, the issue was tackled by
simply removing the discriminatory proxy in question. Every feature within
a data set is correlated with other features, however, and continuously elimi-
nating data in this way means that at some point, there will be no data left
at all.
We made several forays into computationally categorizing discriminatory
proxies, first by investigating the relationship between discriminatory proxies
of different degrees, then by magnitude of harm. Our efforts were stymied
by the nebulous nature of most protected attributes, which made it difficult
to distinguish between a discriminatory proxy and an aspect of the attribute
itself. For example, skin color and nationality both correlate but do not cause
- in the traditional sense - race, and by that definition, are discriminatory
proxies for race. One would be hard pressed, however, to argue that prejudice
against people of a certain skin color is significantly different in terms of harm
from prejudice against people of a certain race. The problem of defining and
drawing distinction between discriminatory proxies is this: either everything
is a discriminatory proxy, or nothing is.












Sprinkler rain T F
F F 0.4 0.6
F T 0.01 0.99
T F 0.01 0.99
T T 0.01 0.99
Figure 2.2: An example of a simple Bayesian network modeling the relation-
ships between three features.
To accurately portray how discriminatory proxies interact and the compli-
cated relationships between different types of bias, researchers have turned
away from concrete calculations of relationships and towards probabilistic
causal structures. Recent works measure the effect of a protected attribute
by modeling the probability distribution of a class with Bayesian networks,
which are able to represent conditional dependencies [23]. A simple example
can be found in Figure 2.2.
Notably, a team of researchers extracted the causal structures existing
among attributes within a data set of historical decision records in the form
of a constrained Bayesian network, on which they performed random walks so
to model a variety of anti-discrimination legal concepts (direct and indirect,
group and individual) that have been under-considered within computational
research [5].
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2.2 Methods
We constructed a Bayesian Network with the goal of creating a transparent
network of dependencies between different features, with the potential to gen-
erate synthetic data that can be used later within our research. Using the
Python package pomegranate for implementing probabilistic models, we built
a basic Bayesian Network modeling a series of relationships between the fol-
lowing features:
• Sentiment (as determined by natural language processing tools)
• Race
• Geographic Location
In this example, race is linked by strong correlation with sentiment and
location is linked by strong correlation to race. With race as a protected
attribute, location becomes a discriminatory proxy for race. Once the model
was trained on known relationships between each pair of features (as expressed
by probabilities between 0 and 1, contained within a Conditional Probability
Table), it was then prompted to predict the value of a protected attribute -
race, in this case - given the known values of sentiment and location.
2.3 Results and Discussion
The model was able to correctly predict the value of the protected attribute
in the slight majority of cases, but the results were ultimately inconclusive.
Though building the network offered us better insight into how proxy dis-
crimination can be computationally represented, it became clear to us that no
synthetic network, even one based off of conditional probabilities, can come
close to matching the intricate webs of relationship represented by even the
most simple of data sets. Our program only tested one linear instance of
proxy discrimination, and the complexity would only increase exponentially as
included features increased. From these results, we made the decision to com-
mit both time and monetary resources to obtain real data for analysis rather
than to build a more complex network to generate synthetic data. Though
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the process was helpful for both our understanding of the existing work in the
field and allowed us to make an educated decision regarding our next steps,
we ultimately had to give up the transparency and clarity that comes with
building our own network for the sake of accurately representing the complex




The decision to commit to gathering and building off of real, human-generated
data brought with it a variety of additional concerns. Social media data is the
primary subject of much of current natural language processing research and
has been used for everything from predicting the outcomes of political elections
[7] to crime prediction [32]. By its nature, however, it works almost entirely
with public data that contains little to no concrete identifiers of identity. Even
when they exist, the opt-in nature of sharing information on social media can
result in biased data sets as the users who share information about geographic
location, for example, is significantly different from the overall population of
users [29].
As a result, demographic information must be obtained for hundreds of
thousands (and more) of individuals for a single trial and the choice often
comes down to relying on either human annotation or prediction by a compu-
tational system. The latter option is magnitudes cheaper and faster, which has
led to an explosion of research describing how to predict the demographics of
Twitter users using everything from regression models built on website traffic
data [12] to text analysis of usernames [35] to recursive neural networks [22].
The performance of these models are ultimately validated on a smaller set
of Twitter users labeled individually for ethnicity and gender by human anno-
tators. Despite criticism and controversy regarding human subject privacy and
inaccuracies in prediction, it is clear that computational demographic predic-
tion is and will continue to be an integral part of natural language processing
and broader computer science research. The general consensus in the com-
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munity seems to be that despite inaccuracies and bias, the ability to predict
demographic information is too crucial to research to give up entirely.
But are human beings really the least biased identifiers of race and gen-
der, or even accurate enough to act as a standard for truth to machines?
Our literature review revealed a growing reliance of research on digital crowd
sourcing and micro-working platforms, particularly Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk), by virtue of being inexpensive and easily accessible. Concerns have
been brought up in the community about the dubious legality and ethics of us-
ing what some call ”sweatshop labor” where workers earn roughly two dollars
an hour [30]. In addition, the vast majority (roughly 70 percent) of all MTurk
workers use the service either as a primary or secondary source of income,
meaning their demographics are not representative of the general population
- specifically skewed towards low-income individuals with less access to higher
education [16]. Many of the papers from our literature review do not describe
the experiment design or benchmarks used for the data annotations done by
humans. Instead, the human demographic annotations were treated as the
ground truth against which uncertain computational models were to be com-
pared against. The consequence of this assumption is that if systematic bias
exists within those human predictions, the accuracy of the paper results - and
possibly, an entire field of research - is called into question.
Due to the time and financial limitations of an undergraduate thesis, our
project had to use MTurk for data annotation. It was important to us that
despite the ethical and accuracy concerns that came with that choice, how-
ever, that we base our experiment design on data as opposed to assumptions.
Though there is no such thing as a perfect experiment design, especially when
working with such thorny topics of bias and fairness, we wanted to be able to
justify why we made the choices we did. In particular, we focused on the ques-
tion of how much and what kind of information to present to our participants
in order to mitigate biases in human annotations.
3.1 Methods
We conducted A/B testing using small collections of personally compiled Twit-
ter accounts with known demographic information and a variety of identities.
Our three trials were:
CHAPTER 3. HUMAN DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTION 18
1. Full Twitter profile, minus the exact username so to protect the privacy
of the users and to discourage participants from accessing additional
information for demographic prediction and biasing our results.
2. Only the text portions of the Twitter profile, which included the display
name and description.
3. Only the image portions of the Twitter profile, which included the cover
photo and profile picture.
After being presented with the above information, the participant is then
given a series of questions to answer regarding how they would predict the
identity of the user. The MTurk task presentation is shown below.
We ran three trials, each with the same ten Twitter profiles, with differing
types of information. Ten participants annotated each user, each for a total
of 300 annotations.
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3.2 Results
Generally, the responses returned by participants were more accurate when
only text information was provided. The split in performance across the trials
was not straightforward and varied based on ethnicity and gender of the profile
(for example, ”white” profiles had similar results across trials, while ”non-
white” profiles had more disparities in annotation in the text and full profile
trials), though certain general patterns did arise. Comparing the results for
the text-only trials with the full profile, we found that including the image
encouraged users to ignore some of the information within the text entirely.
For the most part, the results from full profile trials were more similar to
those from image-only trials than those from text-only trials. For example,
including images resulted in predictions of lower education levels for ”female”
profiles, but especially so for profiles that were annotated as both ”female”
and ”non-white.”
3.3 Discussion
Due to the limitations in the sample size and insufficient results to determine
statistical significance, no wide-sweeping conclusions can or should be made
based on the data from these experiments. Conducting these trials provided
us with context with which to make more educated decisions regarding our
final experiment design, however.
Our main takeaway was that images tended to polarize our annotators,
possibly because it allowed more room for a human annotator to inject their
own biases into their predictions. Though differences in overall accuracy were
not immediately clear, the results from the text-only trials appeared more
grounded in the information provided. On the other hand, trials that included
images had more annotations that were not directly drawn from any of the
data provided to the annotator.
With that in mind, we made the decision to conduct our data annotations
with only the text data that would be visible on a Twitter profile page. Though
we were concerned by the apparent biases and polarization that emerged when
images were included, our main consideration was to prioritize transparency
in our data annotations. Sociolinguistic identity and actual identity demo-
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graphics are deeply linked but do not always align, and because the task of
toxicity detection falls under natural language processing, biases that emerge
will pertain more so to sociolinguistic identity than to the real demographics of
the users, which can be more apparent with profile and cover images. Though
conducting human demographic predictions using only text may not give us
the most accurate results in regards to actual identity of a user, they result in
decisions that are based more on information found in the presented data than
from an annotator’s personal beliefs. Ultimately, we decided that the latter




The primary goal of this study is to determine how Perspective API performs
on tweets made by users across different demographic categories. We calcu-
lated the distribution curves and cumulative distribution functions for each
of our chosen demographic categories, then determined statistical significance
between pairs of demographics within the same group. Finally, we compiled
collections of the most toxic tweets for each demographic category so to gain
better insight into what the Perspective API determined to be harmful.
4.1 Methods
We used the Tweepy streaming Python library to pick up the usernames and
descriptions, with emojis removed, of 3000 active users which we then split
into three batches of 1000 each. Each batch was then submitted to Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk platform with three annotations requested for each user. The
questions provided here were similar to those used in our earlier A/B testing,
with the only difference being that ethnicity was broadened from a simple
”White/Not White” dichotomy to incorporate the following four categories:
White, Black, Asian, and Latinx.
We then parsed through the results to make two lists of users for each
demographic category: consensus, to denote the users who were labeled as
the particular demographic by all three of their annotators; and chosen, to
denote the users who were labeled as the particular demographic by at least
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Group Demographic Chosen Consensus
Age 13-18 682 6
Age 19-25 264 71
Age 26-30 276 55
Age 31-40 74 11
Age 40 and up 68 18
Race Asian 56 8
Race Black 168 35
Race Latinx 36 15
Race White 619 204
Education High School 214 34
Education College 584 202
Education Graduate School 78 14
Gender Male 593 312
Gender Female 367 142
Gender Other 11 4
Table 4.1: Number of accounts by demographic
two out of three of their annotators. Though the number of accounts found per
demographic varied somewhat across batches, the general proportions stayed
the same. Our data for Batch 1 can be found in Table 4.1 below.
Though we initially hoped to use consensus accounts, it was clear that the
small number of consensus accounts in some cases would result in significant
bias from even just one account. We then scraped up to 3200 tweets of the
most recent tweets for each user, eliminating retweets and quotes, and built
a mapping between each user and their data set of tweets to efficiently create
data sets of all tweets made by a user that had been a chosen account for a
particular demographic. The data sets of tweets were then cleaned by removing
all texts that were not in English and replacing shared URLs and mentioned
users with the tokens ”URL” and ”USERNAME” so to preserve the original
structure of the tweet and increase the accuracy of later processing.
Using the Perspective API, we calculated for each tweet the scores for the
following categories:







For our data analysis, we focused on the Toxicity category as all others have
since been removed from the newest releases of Perspective API. Using the
data visualization library Seaborn, we plotted the distribution graphs for each
demographic for toxicity scores from 0.5 to 1.0, as well as cumulative dis-
tribution functions for each group. A one-way ANOVA test was performed
using SciPy on each pair of demographics within the same group, due to our
large sample sizes. Our goal was to determine if the distribution of toxicity
originated from the same distribution, or in other words, whether the dispar-
ities between the toxicity distributions between different demographics were
statistically significant. Finally, we outputted data sets of the most toxic (as
determined as toxicity scores greater than or equal to 0.8) tweets for each
demographic.
4.2 Results
The distribution and cumulative distribution function (CDF) graphs were
broadly similar across all demographics. As seen below, however, the most
variation lay in the Age and Race groups, with virtually no difference within
the Gender and Education groups.
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We calculated the cumulative distribution functions and conducted one-
way ANOVA tests for pairs of demographics within the same group. For each
group, we validated our usage of the ANOVA test by running it on two data
sets from the same demographic and receiving a p-value that indicated a lack
of significant statistical difference. Our results can be seen below.
19-25 26-30 31-40 40up
13-18 3.45e− 5 3.87e− 4 0.02 0.01
19-25 0.50 1.35e− 11 1.85e− 6
26-30 8.12e− 10 7.01e− 6
31-40 0.18
Table 4.2: p-values calculated between age demographic pairs. Values lesser
than 0.05 denote a statistically significant difference between the distributions.
Female Other
Male 8.48e− 8 0.52
Female 3.26e− 8
Table 4.3: p-values calculated between gender demographic pairs. Values lesser
than 0.05 denote a statistically significant difference between the distributions.
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White Latinx Asian
Black 1.43e− 57 1.84e− 6 7.12e-65
White 2.80e− 20 0.01
Latinx 4.17e− 31
Table 4.4: p-values calculated between race demographic pairs. Values lesser
than 0.05 denote a statistically significant difference between the distributions.
College Graduate School
High School 0.015 1.23e− 8
College 1.82e− 5
Table 4.5: p-values calculated between education demographic pairs. Values
lesser than 0.05 denote a statistically significant difference between the distri-
butions.
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Distribution of Toxicity Scores (0.5-1.0) across Age
Groups
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Distribution of Toxicity Scores (0.5-1.0) across Race
Groups
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Distribution of Toxicity Scores (0.5-1.0) across Gender
Groups
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Distribution of Toxicity Scores (0.5-1.0) across
Education Groups
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Examining the most toxic tweets for each demographic revealed an abun-
dance of false positives and false negatives. Some examples are shown in Table
4.6.
Text Score
Oh shit! Is that a spider web? 0.910651
It’s not like Trump has a magic want he can wave and ””poof
goes the illegals.”” Unfortunately the #DEMONcratParty has
a lot of power. Quite frankly, I’m surprised that Trump
was able to do what he did for our country, despite Nancy
#Bitchlosi and grand coon #MaxineWaters
0.34032694
Me at 20, who gives a fuck 0.91888636
Stay the fuck at home! Hahah 0.9516197
They are not immigrants, they are illegals and they ARE IN-
VADERS, when they come across illegally. You d think some-
one running for US congressman would know that
0.46589994
Can God please work a miracle and get rid of is pandemic,
I’m sick and tired of staying in my room, sick of numbers
rising rapidly, innocent people are being killed and cannot sa
goodbye to their families, disgusting ass people treating the
victims body like shit.
0.92024845
IMAGINE BEING THIS FCKN TALENTED I AM SHOOK 0.83785176
That s drip that can t just be got at the mall!!! Queen shit
only
0.8763313
They talking bout we might have to work from home cause of
this corona virus shit I m shooked no cap.
0.8376127
Table 4.6: Toxicity scores calculated by Perspective API, 2020
The inclusion of profanity was the strongest indicator for toxicity, with a
significant amount of the most toxic tweets being short pieces of text contain-
ing one curse word. On the other hand, tweets that attacked particular people
or groups without using profanity, or even used racial slurs, received compar-
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atively low toxicity scores. On the other hand, tweets that included slang
and linguistic features originating from African American Vernacular English
(AAVE) received higher toxicity scores.
4.3 Discussion
Our research sought to find differences between performance across demo-
graphic categories, but disparities in performance appeared to be tied much
more to the amount of profanity and or contextual toxicity. It is important to
note that age and race, the two groups that did show significant differences in
distribution and CDF graphs, are both sociolinguistic identities that are influ-
enced strongly by the usage of profanity [28]. The vast majority of tweets that
Perspective API scores as highly toxic are false positives due to the prevalence
of innocuous profanity usage on social media, which suggests that the model
performs inaccurately on much of the social media data it is meant to run on.
Though inaccuracy does not necessarily imply lack of fairness, the two are
deeply linked in this case. Disparate impact based on the usage of profanity
seems relatively innocuous, as profanity is not a protected attribute like race,
gender, or age. Drawing from our previous discussion of proxy discrimina-
tion, however, we find that usage of profanity correlates so strongly with the
protected attributes of age and race that its inclusion nonetheless results in
concerning disparities in performance that are linked to protected attributes.
Overall, our results indicate that while Perspective API is highly effective
at identifying tweets that contain profanity, it performs less effectively when
finding tweets that cause harm. The overwhelming majority of highly toxic
(with scores above 0.8) tweets were short pieces of text input that contained
profanity, effectively masking tweets that contained slurs, attacks on identity,
and what can legally be defined as hate speech that were given scores ranging
from 0.3 to 0.5. It is important to note that the issue of false positives within
Perspective API leads directly to that of false negatives in that the model
does not score the false negatives as completely harmless, rather that the their
toxicity scores appear insignificant and comparatively safe in comparison to
the large number of tweets with high toxicity scores. In other words, the model
prioritizes profanity over personal and identity-related attacks, likely because
there are simply many more instances of the former in any social media data
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set than the latter, just from the nature of how people communicate on the
Internet - including the toxicity data sets used for training by Jigsaw.
4.4 Next Steps
There are a number of next steps for this research as our investigation did not
prove its hypothesis as much as it unearthed an alternate angle under which
toxicity and hate speech detection should be evaluated.
We found that the performance of Perspective API depended not on con-
ventional categories of demographic information, but on linguistic features and
terminology that acted as discriminatory proxies for identity. Instead of focus-
ing on how models perform differently on data generated across demographics,
our next steps would focus on disparities across different kinds of language and
content. That is not to say that it is more important to discuss censorship of
profanity over racial and age biases, but rather to acknowledge that the latter
are a by-effect of the former and that more clear results can be generated by




The Perspective API has experienced its share of criticism and praise, both of
which are justified. Ultimately, the model does not perform badly as much as
it simply performs in ways that are undirected. These problems of fairness and
equity originate not from technical errors within its code, but from incorrect
or oversimplified assumptions made in research and experimental design. The
Perspective API models were trained on large data sets to determine ’toxicity’,
a nebulous term that a data-driven systems cannot define independently. Tox-
icity can mean sentiments of anger in one context and the usage of racial slurs
in another, and the arbitrary conflation of these very different circumstances
is what drives systematic disparate impact. Entirely technical solutions like
up-weighting parts of a data set do not fully address and resolve the prob-
lem. Ultimately, they act as temporary patches over a particular symptom of
muddled design that must be added to when another issue arises.
Without outside interference, computers will prioritize efficiency and cor-
relation, not human concepts of harm and fairness. This is not to criticize
computational research, more to point out that injustice within technology
often arises when data-driven systems are used to solve problems that are out
of its scope - whether they are issues that cannot be fully represented by data
or just simply too general to allow a computer to define. Technology is most
effective when it attempts to solve specific and well-defined problems. When
it is forced to fill in the gaps, inaccuracies and biases arise.
This is not to say that technology makes more mistakes than humans do,
rather that the consequences of injustice within technology are distinctly harm-
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ful in ways that merit our concern. Not only are our current ethical and legal
systems designed to manage people and are therefore ill-suited for regulating
technologies, but the myth of objectivity that surrounds tech can lead people
to put more trust in machines than they would in another person. While the
calculations and mathematics within computer science are indeed objective,
the design choices that govern them are deeply influenced by human biases.
Instead, computational research that attempt to solve human problems should
lean into its inherent subjectivity and draw from theory outside of the field of
computer science to make informed decisions. The vast majority, if not all of
these definitions are imperfect and extremely dependent on context. What is
most important for technology right now is not to be perfect, however, but for
it to be transparent and accountable.
On that note, the team behind Perspective API appears to be taking a
step in the right decision by pivoting away from the monumental task of both
computationally defining and finding general toxicity towards more specific
and targeted categories of harmful language with a long history in legal liter-
ature, like ”Flirting” and ”Identity Attack.” Though it is more likely than not
that these models too will have their own problems and imperfections, their
specificity and precedence in broader theory allows for regulation and improve-
ments. It is our hope that the decision marks a far-reaching shift within the
field of computer science towards prioritizing the transparency and account-
ability of algorithms, models, and systems over their immediate outcomes.
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[14] Pablo Delgado. How El Páıs used AI to make their comments section
less toxic. Mar. 2019. url: https://www.blog.google/outreach-
initiatives/google- news- initiative/how- el- pais- used- ai-
make-their-comments-section-less-toxic/.
[15] Anthony W. Flores, Kristin Bechtel, and Christopher T. Lowenkamp.
False Positives, False Negatives, and False Analyses: A Rejoinder to
“Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to Predict
Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks.”. url: http://www.
crj.org/assets/2017/07/9_Machine_bias_rejoinder.pdf.
[16] Karen Fort, Gilles Adda, and K. Bretonnel Cohen. “Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk: Gold Mine or Coal Mine?” In: Computational Linguistics 37
(2011), pp. 413–420. doi: 10.1162/COLI_a_00057.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 38
[17] Sorelle A. Friedler, Carlos Scheidegger, and Suresh Venkatasubrama-
nian. On the (im)possibility of fairness... Sept. 2016. url: https://
algorithmicfairness.wordpress.com/2016/09/26/on-the-impossibility-
of-fairness/.
[18] Sorelle A. Friedler et al. “A comparative study of fairness-enhancing
interventions in machine learning”. In: Proceedings of the Conference
on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency - FAT* 19 (2019). doi:
10.1145/3287560.3287589.
[19] Google’s comment-ranking system will be a hit with the alt-right. url:
https://www.engadget.com/2017-09-01-google-perspective-
comment-ranking-system.html.
[20] Jessica Guynn. Facebook while black: Users call it getting ’Zucked,’ say




[21] Ben Hutchinson and Margaret Mitchell. “50 Years of Test (Un)fairness”.
In: Proceedings of the Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Trans-
parency - FAT* 19 (2019). doi: 10.1145/3287560.3287600.
[22] Sunghwan Mac Kim et al. “Demographic Inference on Twitter using Re-
cursive Neural Networks”. In: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Meeting of
the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 2: Short Papers)
(2017). doi: 10.18653/v1/p17-2075.
[23] Koray Mancuhan and Chris Clifton. “Combating discrimination using
Bayesian networks”. In: Artificial Intelligence and Law 22.2 (2014), pp. 211–
238. doi: 10.1007/s10506-014-9156-4.
[24] Northpointe. COMPAS Risk and Need Assessment System. url: http:
//www.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf.
[25] Cathy ONeil. Weapons of math destruction: how big data increases in-
equality and threatens democracy. Penguin Books, 2016.
[26] Perspective. url: https://www.perspectiveapi.com/#/home.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 39
[27] Maarten Sap et al. “The risk of racial bias in hate speech detection”. In:
Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Compu-
tational Linguistics. 2019, pp. 1668–1678.
[28] H. Andrew Schwartz et al. “Personality, Gender, and Age in the Lan-
guage of Social Media: The Open-Vocabulary Approach”. In: PLoS ONE
8.9 (2013). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073791.
[29] Luke Sloan and Jeffrey Morgan. “Who Tweets with Their Location?
Understanding the Relationship between Demographic Characteristics
and the Use of Geoservices and Geotagging on Twitter”. In: Plos One
10.11 (June 2015). doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0142209.
[30] Jeremy Snyder. “Exploitation and sweatshop labor: Perspectives and
issues”. In: Business Ethics Quarterly 20.2 (2010), pp. 187–213.
[31] Daisuke Wakabayashi. Google Cousin Develops Technology to Flag Toxic
Online Comments. Feb. 2017. url: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/23/technology/google-jigsaw-monitor-toxic-online-comments.
html?_r=0.
[32] Xiaofeng Wang, Matthew S. Gerber, and Donald E. Brown. “Automatic
Crime Prediction Using Events Extracted from Twitter Posts”. In: Social
Computing, Behavioral - Cultural Modeling and Prediction Lecture Notes
in Computer Science (2012), pp. 231–238. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-
29047-3_28.
[33] Zeerak Waseem and Dirk Hovy. “Hateful Symbols or Hateful People?
Predictive Features for Hate Speech Detection on Twitter”. In: Proceed-
ings of the NAACL Student Research Workshop (2016), pp. 88–93. doi:
10.18653/v1/N16-2013.
[34] Williams, Brooks, and Shmargad. “How Algorithms Discriminate Based
on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy Implications”. In:
Journal of Information Policy 8 (2018), p. 78. doi: 10.5325/jinfopoli.
8.2018.0078.
[35] Zach Wood-Doughty et al. “Predicting Twitter User Demographics from
Names Alone”. In: Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Computa-
tional Modeling of People’s Opinions, Personality, and Emotions in So-
cial Media (2018). doi: 10.18653/v1/w18-1114.
